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NOTES
was December 4. Small traces of gas were discovered on Novem-
ber 23, and again on December 2. On December 5, the well began
to flow and by December 7, it had been brought in as a producer.
The owner of the royalty interest contended that the traces found
before December 5 interrupted prescription, even though they
were not in paying quantitiesis until about the 5th. The court
held that prescription was not interrupted and that the royalty
interest was prescribed. Although a royalty interest is not the
same as a mineral servitude, in that actual production is required
in the former, it is submitted that the situation is analogous for
purposes of analysis of the court's view on the prescription of
non-user.
When the question is presented to the court as to whether a
mineral servitude owner, who at the termination of the prescrip-
tive period has not yet completed a well to a depth at which
minerals could reasonably be expected in paying quantities, should
be allowed to continue drilling operations, the court should decide
that the servitude owner is to be judged by what he has accom-
plished during the prescriptive period-namely, whether he has
drilled to a depth at which there is reasonable hope of minerals
in paying quantities-and not by what he intends to do after the
expiration of the prescriptive period.
JOHN V. PARKER
OBLIGATIONS-AGREEMENTS IN RESTRAINT OF COMPETITION
The vendor of a business contracted not to engage in or
become financially interested in the ready-to-wear business for
three years in the city, nor within a three and a half mile radius
of the location of the business sold, both parties understanding
that the vendor would continue to operate a Five and Ten Cent
Novelty store also owned by him. Held, the vendee was entitled
to an injunction prohibiting the vendor from selling in the Five
and Ten Cent Store any ready-to-wear or dry goods other than
the kind handled when the sale of the ready-to-wear business
was made. Loftin v. Parker, 253 Ala. 98, 42 So. 2d 824 (1949).
The decision was based on the lawfulness of the restraint
imposed. Recognizing that contracts in total restraint of trade
18. To interrupt prescription on a royalty interest it is required that there
be actual production of minerals in paying quantities. See Escoubas v. Loui-
siana Petroleum & Coal Oil Co., 22 La. Ann. 280 (1870); Green v..Standard
Oil Co. of La., 146 La. 935, 84 So. 211 (1920); Daggett, Mineral Rights in Loui-
siana, § 31 (rev. ed. 1949).
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were unlawful as against public policy, the court found it unneces-
sary to inquire into the reasonableness and legality of this par-
ticular agreement since those of its type were declared lawful
by statute.'
The Louisiana cases dealing with agreements not to compete
may be divided into two groups: those decided on the issue of
the lawfulness of the restraint imposed and those which were
invalidated on the ground that the consideration received was
not "serious" and that a potestative condition was involved.
Determining the legality of the restraint imposed is in effect
a weighing and balancing of the interests involved. The public
interest is to insure the benefits of competition by prohibiting
the acquisition of monopolies through private contract and to
prevent an individual from becoming a burden upon society by
contracting away his means of livelihood. On the other hand,
the investor must be afforded some protection for his investment,
and the vendor seeks to enhance the value of goods or services
sold by agreeing not to compete.2
In any case, the restraint in order to be lawful must be reason-
able and be such that it affords only that protection necessary to
the obligee.3 It must be incidental to and in support of another
lawful contract or sale by which the obligee acquires some inter-
est needing protection. One simply contemplating engaging in a
business cannot bind himself not to do so in favor of another
already in the business. 4
It has been held that a person may npt contract not to pursue
at any time and place the calling whereby he earns a livelihood.5
Following this theory restraints unlimited as to both time and
geographical area or limited as to time but unlimited as to area
are void. Generally those limited in area are enforceable although
unlimited in time of operation.0
In each case the situation of the parties, prevailing economic
circumstances, and the nature of the business restrained are con-
siderations as important as the elements of time and area. Any
factors tending to establish fair protection for the obligee, or to
show an undue hardship on the obligor or interference with the
1. Ala. Code (1940) tit. 9, §§ 22-24.
2. Moorman & Givens v. Parkerson, 127 La. 835, 54 So. 47 (1911).
3. M. M. Ullman & Co. v. Levy, 172 La. 79, 133 So. 369 (1931).
4. Webb Press Co., Ltd. v. Bierce, 116 La. 905, 41 So. 203 (1906).




interests of the public should be included in the determination
of reasonableness. 7
The restraint is dependent upon the continued existence of
the interest acquired by the obligee in the contract to which the
restraint was incidental. If that interest, such as a lease, termi-
nates with the expiration of the principal contract the restraint
cannot be extended beyond it.8 The obligation is personal and
cannot be enforced against third parties to whom the obligor
might lease or sell property or by third parties who might suc-
ceed the obligee.9 If the promise made is simply not to "engage"
in a particular business, nothing short of actual participation in
the management of a competing business with a financial interest
therein will suffice as a violation.'0 Serving as a simple employee
of a competing firm is not a violation."
In the second type of cases,' 2 those involving an agreement
not to compete, which were rendered unenforceable on the ground
that the consideration was not "serious" and that they were sub-
ject to a potestative condition, have all dealt with contracts of
employment, terminable at the option of either party with a
specified notice given, with the employee agreeing not to compete
within a given area for a specified time.
In Blanchard v. Haber,"3 the plaintiff hired the defendant to
work as a practicing dentist at a salary of sixty dollars a week
which was later raised to eighty. The contract was to run for ten
years but could be terminated by either party with thirty days'
notice. It was stipulated that if the contract was terminated by
either party, the defendant was to refrain from practicing den-
tistry within five blocks of the plaintiff's establishment for ten
years. After some time the defendant resigned and set up a dental
establishment in violation of the agreement and the plaintiff sued
for an injunction. The court, construing the contract in the light
of the most extreme possible circumstances, stated that since the
contract was terminable at the will of the employer, the only
7. Ibid. Hickman v. Branan, 151 So. 113 (La. App. 1933). For additional
cases see Notes, 3 A.L.R. 247 (1919).
8. M. M. Ullman & Co. v. Levy, 172 La. 79, 133 So. 369 (1931).
9. Hebert & Damare v. Dupaty, 42 La. Ann. 343, 7 So. 580 (1890); Sim-
mons v. Johnson, 11 So. 2d 710 (La. App. 1942).
10. Simmons v. Johnson, 11 So. 2d 710 (La. App. 1942).
11. May v. Johnson, 128 So. 540 (La. App. 1930).
12. Blanchard v. Haber, 166 La. 1014, 118 So. 117 (1928); Shreveport Laun-
dries, Inc. v. Teagle, 139 So. 563 (La. App. 1932), action dismissed 144 So. 183
(La. App. 1932); Cloverland Dairy Products Co., Inc. v. Grace, 180 La. 694,




right received by the employee is that of employment for the
period required for giving notice. Thus it was possible for the
plaintiff to discharge the defendant after one month's service and
put him out of business as a competitor for ten years. By extend-
ing Civil Code Article 2464 to mean that the consideration must
not be altogether out of proportion to the obligation, it was said
that this consideration was not "serious" and could not support
the obligation. Thus, without consideration, the execution of the
agreement was made subject solely to the will of the employer.
As such, it was subject to a potestative condition, and unenforce-
able under Civil Code Articles 2024 and 2034.
In the case of Cali v. National Linen Service Corporation,14
the defendant worked as a driver on a delivery route at a salary
of thirty dollars a week. The contract stipulated that he should
not work in a competing business in the city of New Orleans
within one year after its termination. The Federal Circuit Court
of Appeals granted an injunction, thereby enforcing the clause
preventing competition. The court said:
"There is nothing in the case of Blanchard v. Haber, supra,
compelling a reversal in this case. Doubtless, had the salary
paid Haber been considered adequate and the restrictions
reasonable, the decision would have been different." 15
In the subsequent case of Shreveport Laundries v. Teagle,16
the Louisiana Court of Appeals followed the reasoning of the
Blanchard case. The court took the opportunity to reject expressly
the interpretation placed upon the Blanchard case by the federal
court, saying that although it was intimated that the restriction
was unreasonable, the adequateness of the salary was not con-
sidered.
A careful examination of the opinions in the case leads to
the conviction that actually the consideration of public policy
was uppermost in the courts' minds. Recognition was given to
the unequal bargaining power of the parties, 7 and it was undoubt-
edly felt that an agreement which a person had entered into only
as an alternative between that and immediate discharge or con-
tinued unemployment should not be allowed to work a hardship
on him. Such conditions are closely akin to duress depriving one
of the free exercise of his will.
14. 38 F. 2d 35 (5th Cir. 1930).
15. Id. at 37.
16. 139 So. 563 (La. App. 1932).
17. Shreveport Laundries, Inc. v. Teagle, 139 So. 563, 565 (La. App. 1932).
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However, Civil Code Article 2464 has no application to such
a case, and the doctrine of "serious consideration" as it is known
in our law is in itself a fallacy. The article deals exclusively
with the question of price in a contract of sale."" Even as such
it does not declare that the price be adequate but only that it be
certain and be intended to be paid, not a mere pretense. The
intent of the provision is to distinguish between a valid sale and
a donation disguised as a simulated sale.19 The doctrine of "seri-
ous consideration," as it has been used by our courts, if carried
to its logical limits, would render. useless the particular provisions
of lesion beyond moiety20 and the restricted circumstances under
which they may be applied. The theory of equivalents would be
extended to all obligations.
Further, under the guise of serious consideration the court
is inquiring into the sufficiency of consideration which is in
direct contravention of the basic civilian theory, that if the requi-
sites of a valid contract are present 21-capacity to contract, con-
sent, object, and a lawful purpose-a man is bound as he sees fit
to bind himself.22
Having found that the consideration on the part of the em-
ployer was not "serious" and hence ineffective, the Louisiana
court held 23 that the performance of his obligation was subject
to a potestative condition. The legal effects resulting from the
fact that one of the promises in a bilateral contract is subject to
a potestative condition are substantially the same as at common
law where one promise is illusory.2 4 The other party is not bound
by his promise because he has received in return an unenforceable
promise, the performance of which depends solely upon the will
of the promisor.
However, the Louisiana court is losing sight of the fact that
many valid obligations may be contracted under a potestative
condition, but it is only those obligations dependent upon a purely
potestative condition, or subject solely to the will of the obligor,
18. Arts. 2456-2466, La. Civil Code of 1870 (Title: How the Contract of
Sale is to be Perfected).
19. Spanter v. Devoe, 52 La. Ann. 581, 27 So. 174 (1900); Saunders v.
Busch-Everett Co., 138 La. 1049, 71 So. 153 (1914). See Note, 8 Tulane L. Rev.
178 (1933).
20. Arts. 1860-1880, La. Civil Code of 1870.
21. Art. 1779, La. Civil Code of 1870.
22. Lorenzen, Causa and Consideration in the Law of Contracts, 28 Yale
L.J. 621 (1919); Walton, Cause and Consideration in Contracts, 41 L.Q. Rev.
306 (1925).
23. See cases cited note 12, supra.
24. A.L.I., Restatement of Contracts, §§ 2, 79.
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which are unenforceable under Article 2034.25 It is clear that
none of the obligations involved was subject entirely to the will
of the employer since, in any event, the employment must have
continued for a specified time beyond the announcement of either
that he wished to withdraw.
In looking to the employee's motive or cause for making his
promise not to compete and the conditions under which it was
made, the court undoubtedly felt that he had given his promise
in return for continued employment during the period provided.
If such employment "was thereafter expected to exist or take
place, and which did not take place or exist," 26 the contract could
be said to be without cause and would have no effect.2 7
If the agreement imposes an undue hardship on the employee
and is against the interests of society it should be invalidated as
being contra bonos mores28 and unlawful.29 If the court sees fit
to inquire into what has been received by the employee for his
promise, it may be done on the basis of determining the legality
of the restraint. The value of the consideration received could
be weighed along with all other factors in determining the reason-
ableness of the restraint in the light of its effect on the obligor,
the obligee, and the general public.
Conclusions as to what is reasonable will vary from court
to court, from person to person, depending to a great extent on
the individual making the decision.80 But if decided on the basis
of public policy, the desired uniformity will be attained without
doing damage to other fundamental concepts.
If the case of Loftin v. Parker had arisen in Louisiana, it is
to be expected and desired that the same result would have been
25, Kennon v. Brooks-Scanlon Co., 148 La. 120, 86 So. 675 (1920); Morrison
v. Mioton, 163 La. 1065, 113 So. 456 (1927); Nabors Oil Corp., Inc. v. Samuels,
170 La. 57, 127 So. 363 (1930); Colbert v. District Grand Lodge No. 21, Grand
United Order of Odd Fellows, 178 So. 694 (La. App. 1938).
26. Art. 1897, La. Civil Code of 1870.
27. Arts. 1893, 1894, 1896, 1897, La. Civil Code of 1870.
28. Arts. 1895, 1893, La. Civil Code of 1870.
29. La. Act 133 of 1934 (La. R.S. [1950] 23:921), prohibiting the issuance
of injunctions to enforce contracts of this character. Also note the manner
in which common law jurisdictions have handled agreements of this sort by
limiting the circumstances under which they will be declaredt lawful. For
example, Samuel Stores, Inc. v. Abrams, 94 Conn. 248, 108 Atl. 541 (1919);
Goff v. Saxon, 174 Ky. 330, 192 S.W. 24 (1917); Tarr v. Steerman, 264 Ill. 110,
105 N.E. 957 (1914).
30. See Lindstrom v. Sauer, 166 So. 636 (La. App. 1936), which takes an
extremely limited view of all agreements in restraint of trade.
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reached since the determination of the lawfulness of the restraint
is much the same in civil, as in common law.
THEODORE C. STRICKLAND
SALES-EFFECT OF RECORDATION ON COMMUNITY RIGHTS
Leaving his wife at the marital domicile in Mississippi, Isiah
Payne came to Louisiana. He purchased immovable property in
Bossier Parish, reciting his marital status as single in the recorded
act of sale. A divorce was subsequently obtained by the husband
in Bossier Parish by substituted service without his wife's knowl-
edge; the judgment was not recorded in the conveyance records
of the parish. Defendant then bought the property from the hus-
band and again the recorded sale stated that the husband was a
single man. Plaintiff, aware of the husband's true marital status,
went to Mississippi and bought the wife's undivided one-half
interest in the property. He then immediately brought a petitory
action, seeking to be adjudicated owner of a one-half interest in
the property. Held, under Article 2266 of the Civil Code1 the
-unrecorded divorce judgment affecting the immovable property
in controversy was utterly null and void as to the defendant, a
third party relying on the public records. Humphreys v. Royal,
215 La. 567, 41 So. 2d 220 (1949).
Article 2266 is the codal basis for what has come to be known
as the doctrine of McDuffie v. Walker: third parties who engage
in transactions that involve immovable property are entitled to
rely upon the public records, even if they have actual notice of
unrecorded claims against the property.2 Behind this established
doctrine stands the public policy of protecting the security of real
estate transactions.
The doctrine of McDuffie v. Walker has at various times come
into conflict with other settled rules of law. Among these are the
1. "All sales, contracts and judgments affecting immovable property,
which shall not be so recorded, shall be utterly null and void, except between
the parties thereto. The recording may be made at any time, but shall only
affect third persons from the time of the recording.
"The recording shall have effect from the time when the act is deposited
in the proper office, and indorsed by the proper officer." Art 2266, La. Civil
Code of 1870. See also Arts. 2262, 2264, 2265, La. Civil Code of 1870.
2. McDuffie v. Walker, 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100 (1909), doctrine discussed in:
Coyle v. Allen, 168 La. 504, 509, 122 So. 596, 598 (1929); Westwego Canal and
Terminal Co., Inc. v. Pizanie, 174 La. 1068, 1071, 142 So. 691, 692 (1932); State
ex rel. Hebert v. Recorder of Mortgages, 175 La. 94, 143 So. 15 (1932); Masters
v. Cleveland, 158 So. 382, 385 (La. App. 1935); Gulf Refining Co. v. Evans,
181 So. 666, 670 (La. App. 1938). See also Notes, 14 Tulane L. Rev. 16 (1939),
22 Tulane L. Rev. 208 (1947), 23 Tulane L. Rev. 259 (1949).
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